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CHEVRON’S FLEXIBLE AGENCY EXPERTISE 
MODEL:  APPLYING THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE 
TO THE BIA’S INTERPRETATION OF THE INA’S 
CRIMINAL LAW–BASED AGGRAVATED FELONY 
PROVISION 
Michael Dorfman-Gonzalez* 
 
For nearly thirty years, courts have looked to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
when reviewing a challenge to an agency’s interpretation of statutory 
language and determining whether deference is appropriate.  Despite 
Chevron’s longstanding role as one of administrative law’s most important 
legal doctrines, no specification exists as to whether judicial deference is 
required when an agency interprets language outside the scope of its 
expertise.  As a result, the Second and Third Circuits have split on the issue 
of whether the Bureau of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) interpretation of the 
term “aggravated felony,” a phrase drawn from criminal law, deserves a 
traditional Chevron analysis. 
This Note addresses the conflict and proposes a model of Chevron’s 
framework that permits courts to remain flexible when considering an 
agency’s nontraditional expertise, an outcome contemplated by Chevron’s 
theoretical framework and the Court’s ruling in Chevron itself.  Ultimately, 
this Note resolves the split in favor of the application of Chevron deference 
to the BIA’s interpretation of language drawn from criminal law, despite 
the agency’s traditional expertise in immigration law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, nineteen-year-old Ushian Kayon James legally entered the 
United States, leaving his home of Jamaica.1  Only three years after 
entering, James learned that he would be forced to leave his new home, as 
the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that he engaged in a 
sexual relationship with a sixteen-year-old girl when he was twenty-two 
years of age, constituting the “sexual abuse of a minor” and thus an 
“aggravated felony” pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA).2  James, faced with the prospect of deportation, challenged the 
determination that his relationship with a sixteen-year-old minor constituted 
sexual abuse.3  His challenge involved the court’s review of the BIA’s 
interpretation of “aggravated felony” and the open question of whether the 
judiciary must defer to the BIA or review the case anew.4 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal ruling in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,5 courts have granted deference 
to administrative agencies when reviewing their interpretation of 
ambiguous statutory language.6  While Chevron has guided the judiciary for 
nearly thirty years, the application of the doctrine to the BIA’s 
interpretation of the term “aggravated felony” has divided the Second and 
Third Circuits.7  Although the term appears in the INA and is thus well 
within the scope of the BIA’s interpretative power, its primary usage is 
derived from criminal law and not immigration law.  Thus, while the 
Second Circuit has held that Chevron’s two-step analysis applies to the 
BIA’s interpretation of “aggravated felony,” the Third Circuit has opted not 
to apply the doctrine, finding that the BIA’s construction of the term fails to 
implicate the agency’s traditional expertise and does not warrant an analysis 
under Chevron.8 
The Second and the Third Circuits have jurisdiction over a population of 
approximately 7,183,000 immigrants.9  As a result, the circuits serve a 
 
 1. See infra notes 223–24 and accompanying text. 
 2. See infra note 237 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 4. See discussion infra Part II. 
 5. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 6. See discussion infra Part I.B–C. 
 7. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.  The circuit split recently has been the 
subject of increased attention due to holdings by the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit. See 
Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813, 819 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[There] appears to be a split 
in authority on the question whether to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a term drawn 
from criminal law but used in a statute the agency administers.”). See generally Nijhawan v. 
Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (finding that the BIA was not entitled to deference in its 
interpretation of criminal language without resolving the circuit split regarding Chevron’s 
applicability to agency statutory interpretation of criminal law). 
 8. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 9. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:  2012, at 
43 tbl. 38 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0038
.pdf. Although the Third Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over the U.S. Virgin Islands, its 
foreign-born population was not considered for the purposes of calculating the circuits’ 
combined immigrant population. 
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combined population that is 16 percent foreign born,10 a figure higher than 
the average immigrant population in the United States.11  Although in some 
cases a court’s formulation of its standard of review can be considered an 
uncontroversial procedural determination, the aforementioned jurisdictional 
divide has led to inconsistency in how important, life-altering 
determinations are made for James and millions of other legal immigrants 
residing within the geographic domain of the Second and Third Circuits.12  
This Note examines the conflict and proposes a resolution that 
acknowledges an administrative agency’s expertise outside its traditional 
field and creates a more uniform application of the Chevron doctrine for the 
millions of immigrants the circuit split currently affects.13 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the Chevron doctrine, its 
principles, foundational rationales, and overlap with immigration 
regulation.  Part II examines the split between the Second and Third 
Circuits and analyzes how each court has grappled with the application of 
Chevron to the BIA’s interpretation of the INA’s “aggravated felony” 
provision.  Finally, Part III proposes a flexible agency expertise model that 
considers an agency’s nontraditional expertise and applies it to the circuit 
split, resolving the divide in favor of the Second Circuit’s application of 
Chevron’s two-step approach to the BIA’s statutory interpretation of 
language drawn from criminal law. 
I.  THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE, IMMIGRATION REGULATION, AND THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
This Note first provides a necessary background on the administrative 
state, an extensive analysis of the Chevron doctrine, and an overview of 
relevant immigration law and regulation.  Part I.A begins by providing a 
history of the administrative state and its theoretical foundations.  Next, Part 
I.B examines the landmark administrative law case of Chevron by 
discussing its historical precursors, the construction of its two-step 
approach, and the doctrine’s competing foundational theories.  Finally, Part 
I.C provides a background on immigration regulation in the United States 
and examines Chevron’s impact on, and overlap with, immigration law. 
A.  The Administrative State:  Beginnings, Function, and Structure 
Although the administrative state has evolved since its creation, its 
defining features remain virtually the same:  a system where specialized 
agencies within the executive branch engage in the creation and 
 
 10. See National File:  All 50 States, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU,  http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/docs/cenpop2010/CenPop2010_
Mean_ST.txt (last visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
 11. See ELIZABETH M. GRIECO ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE FOREIGN-BORN 
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES:  2010, at 2 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2012pubs/acs-19.pdf. 
 12. See discussion infra Part II. 
 13. See discussion infra Part III.B–C. 
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enforcement of regulations that, when codified by statute, represent law 
with which the general public must comply.14 
While a similar system existed in limited form prior to the twentieth 
century, the administrative state is primarily considered a creature of the 
New Deal era’s progressive conceptions about the role of governmental 
regulation.15  Prior to and during the New Deal era, both scholars and 
politicians supported the creation of a regulatory state separated from 
Congress and shaped by the expertise of trained specialists.16  As a result, 
regulatory agencies were initially created to combat the economic disaster 
of the Great Depression, providing a foundation for what would eventually 
become the modern administrative state.17 
Although there is some debate as to whether these agencies were 
effective in providing economic recovery in the wake of the Great 
Depression, there is little doubt that their unprecedented expansion of the 
administrative state drastically altered the role agencies played in creating 
and enforcing regulatory law.18  In the years following the New Deal, the 
administrative state was accepted and utilized as the answer to regulating 
noneconomic subject matters, expanding far beyond its original economic 
purpose.19  The administrative state’s growth eventually led it to its modern 
form:  a system of hundreds of agencies that regulate fields as diverse as 
immigration, the environment, and space.20 
 
 14. See 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:21 (3d ed. 
2010) (outlining the basic functions of administrative agencies); see also JOHN F. MANNING 
& MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 358–60 (2010). 
 15. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
1189, 1248 (1986); see also MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 380 (discussing the 
administrative state’s New Deal origins); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New 
Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 422 (1987) (noting that the administrative state was created 
during the New Deal). 
 16. See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 380 (discussing the New Deal–era 
interest in the “dispassionate application of technocratic expertise” by trained officials); 
Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review As 
Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 756–57 (2011); Rabin, supra note 
15, at 1267 (discussing the New Deal era’s positive view of agency expertise); Reuel E. 
Schiller, The Era of Deference:  Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal 
Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 406, 416–17 (2007); Sunstein, supra note 15, at 
422–23 (“In the New Deal period, reformers believed that administrative officials would 
serve as independent, self-starting, technically expert, and apolitical agents of change.”). 
 17. See Rabin, supra note 15, at 1248, 1253; see also Schiller, supra note 16, at 413 
(stating that the expansion of the administrative state was a governmental response to the 
Great Depression). 
 18. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text (noting that the New Deal’s 
regulatory expansion was highly influential on the emergence of the modern administrative 
state). 
 19. See Rabin, supra note 15, at 1262–63 (stating that the New Deal caused 
administrative regulation to become an “accepted fact,” leading to further noneconomic 
regulation). 
 20. See OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL, at 
vi–ix (2012) (listing all administrative agencies). 
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1.  Theoretical Framework of the Administrative State:  
Congressional Delegation 
For the administrative state to function as the regulatory body envisioned 
by New Deal reformers, agencies require the power to promulgate and 
enforce regulations.  This power is primarily legislative and generally 
reserved to Congress with its ability to enact law.21  Thus, in order to 
establish an administrative agency with the power to regulate, Congress 
must delegate its inherent legislative powers to that agency.22  As a result, 
Congress ordinarily enacts a statute granting an administrative office or 
agency the power to promulgate regulations in a specific field, as well as 
the power to enforce those regulations through hearings, adjudications, or 
other processes.23 
In addition to granting the administrative state its regulatory power, 
congressional delegation also represented a radical reconceptualization of 
the Constitution, which does not clearly permit the branches to delegate 
their enumerated powers.24  Consequently, Congress is limited in its ability 
to delegate its enumerated legislative powers to administrative agencies by 
the “nondelegation doctrine,” which forbids Congress from delegating too 
broadly without directing the agency to conform to a sufficiently narrow 
“intelligible principle” governing its regulations.25  Despite the existence of 
this limiting doctrine, the Court has not held a congressional delegation to 
violate its principles in seventy-eight years, effectively granting Congress 
the ability to broadly delegate its power to the administrative state without 
fear of violating the Constitution.26 
 
 21. See supra notes 14, 16 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative functions 
of executive agencies and the New Deal desire to separate agencies from the political 
accountability of the legislative branch); see also MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 
360 (noting the similarities between the powers of executive agencies and congressional 
power). 
 22. See 1 KOCH, supra note 14, § 1:21 (discussing congressional delegation); see also 
JACOB A. STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.03 (2013). 
 23. See 1 KOCH, supra note 14, § 1:21 (discussing congressional delegation); see also 
MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 379–80 (discussing the process of congressional 
delegation). 
 24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States . . . .” (emphasis added)); 1 KOCH, supra note 14, § 7:10; 
MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 360 (examining whether Congress is permitted 
to delegate its constitutional power); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative 
State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994); Sunstein, supra note 15, at 447–48. 
 25. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (holding 
that Congress must enact an intelligible statutory principle for its delegation to be valid); see 
also MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 384–92 (discussing the nondelegation 
doctrine and intelligible principle test). 
 26. See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 392 (discussing the “fall” of the 
nondelegation doctrine); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 315, 322 (2000) (observing the intelligible principle’s lenient standard). See generally 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (finding what is, to 
date, the last instance of an administrative agency violating the nondelegation doctrine). 
980 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
2.  Why Delegation?  Examining the Theories Behind 
Congress’s Transfer of Legislative Power 
In addition to empowering administrative agencies, congressional 
delegation accomplishes several secondary goals that would otherwise be 
impossible.27  Specifically, delegation allows for Congress to transfer its 
legislative power to the executive, a clear fulfillment of the New Deal 
reformer’s historical goal of an expert, regulatory body that is also 
politically insulated.28 
The New Deal conception of the administrative state as a body of trained 
specialists underlies a primary rationale of congressional delegation—that 
an executive agency has a high level of expertise in the field it regulates.29  
Congressional delegation, by allowing the expert agency (and not Congress 
itself) to create law, accomplishes this goal by providing agencies with the 
power to regulate, confined to their spheres of expertise.30  In addition to 
expertise, congressional delegation also rests on the New Deal reformer’s 
historical desire to politically insulate the administrative state.31  By 
delegating its legislative power, Congress allows agencies to regulate from 
within the executive branch, removed from the political accountability of 
the legislature.32  Thus, according to the expertise and political 
accountability rationales, congressional delegation serves as a tool in 
achieving some of the very same goals that spurred the creation of the 
administrative state. 
B.  The Doctrine of Chevron Deference and Judicial Review of Agency 
Statutory Interpretation 
Chevron and its foundational principles remain one of the most important 
and frequently cited doctrines in law,33 setting forth the procedure by which 
courts approach their review of agency statutory interpretation.  Part I.B.1 
begins by discussing the pre-Chevron doctrine of judicial review and its 
evolution towards the modern standard.  After a full discussion of 
Chevron’s precursors, Part I.B.2 examines the Chevron Court’s landmark 
decision.  Finally, Part I.B.3 analyzes Chevron’s competing foundational 
theories, all of which attempt to rationalize Chevron’s two-step approach. 
 
 27. See infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
 29. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 30. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708 
(1995) (holding that Congress delegated to the Fish and Wildlife Service the power to 
regulate within its sphere of expertise); MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 380–81 
(presenting the agency expertise rationale of congressional delegation). 
 31. See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 380–81. 
 32. See id. 
 33. As of 2002, Chevron had been cited more than Roe v. Wade, Brown v. Board of 
Education, and Marbury v. Madison combined. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND POLICY:  PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 289 (5th ed. 2002). 
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1.  The Buildup to Chevron:  The Historical Importance 
of Hearst and Skidmore 
Although the Supreme Court explicitly overruled much of the pre-
Chevron doctrine in Chevron itself, it remains important to examine 
Chevron’s precursors as a tool to further understand the Chevron Court’s 
reasoning and intent.  The most fundamental precursors to Chevron include 
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.34 and Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,35 both of 
which focused on a formal distinction between pure and mixed questions of 
law when determining whether a court should defer to an agency’s 
interpretations.36 
In one of the Court’s most important initial decisions regarding the 
parameters of pre-Chevron judicial review, the Hearst Court held that the 
grant of deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation hinged on the 
distinction between pure questions of law and mixed questions of fact and 
law.37  In Hearst, the Court reviewed the National Labor Relations Board’s 
(NLRB) failure to define “newsboys” as “employees” pursuant to the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), a statute the NLRB administered.38  
When determining how to review the NLRB’s interpretation, the Court 
observed that the agency, in applying its interpretation of the NLRA to the 
parties at hand, had engaged in a mixed question of fact and law, a 
congressional power delegated to the agency that warranted some amount 
of deference.39  In doing so, the Hearst Court outlined a distinction that 
would dominate pre-Chevron jurisprudence, holding that, while deference 
would be granted to an agency’s statutory interpretation regarding mixed 
issues of fact and law, a court would review an agency’s interpretation of 
pure law de novo.40 
The Court continued its distinction between mixed and pure questions of 
law in Skidmore, in which it extended its evolving doctrine past formal 
statutory interpretation41 while further clarifying why and how courts 
should defer to administrative agencies.42  In Skidmore, the Court 
considered an agency’s interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
 
 34. 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
 35. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 36. See id. at 139–40; Hearst, 322 U.S. at 120–31 (holding that a court’s grant of 
deference to an administrative agency depends on whether the court was engaging a pure 
question of law or mixed question of fact and law); see also MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra 
note 14, at 812–13 (describing the pre-Chevron judicial reliance on the distinction between 
mixed and pure questions of law). 
 37. See Hearst, 322 U.S. at 130–31; see also Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, 
Agency Commitment, and Force of Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1027–28 (2005). 
 38. See Hearst, 322 U.S. at 114–15; see also John H. Reese, Bursting the Chevron 
Bubble:  Clarifying the Scope of Judicial Review in Troubled Times, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1103, 1112 (2004). 
 39. See Hearst, 322 U.S. at 130–31. 
 40. See id.; see also MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 798–800. 
 41. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139; MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 810 
(“The key distinctions between Hearst and Skidmore seem to be . . . the legal status of their 
interpretative statements.”). 
 42. See infra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. 
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(FLSA), which denied employees overtime compensation for time spent 
overnight at their place of employment.43 
The Court first analyzed whether the agency’s interpretation of the FLSA 
was a mixed or pure question of law in order to determine its standard of 
review, continuing the distinction between pure questions of law and mixed 
questions of fact and law outlined in Hearst.44  Skidmore differed, however, 
in its formulation of the type of deference an agency could receive from a 
court reviewing its statutory interpretation.45  The Skidmore Court held that 
while a court should not automatically adopt an agency’s construction of a 
mixed question of law, the agency’s relevant expertise represented a source 
courts “may properly resort [to] for guidance.”46  As a result, the Court 
found that an agency’s “specialized experience”47 mandated that courts 
review an agency’s interpretations with deference when such interpretations 
engaged mixed questions of fact and law, as opposed to pure questions of 
law.48 
Although both Hearst and Skidmore governed the pre-Chevron approach 
to judicial review of agency statutory interpretation, their standards began 
to erode soon after it became clear that applying formal distinctions 
between pure and mixed questions of law was a confusing and futile task.49  
As a response, a multifactor approach soon evolved, leading to what one 
commentator has described as a “puzzling, ad hoc, incoherent, and 
unpredictable” standard of judicial review.50 
2. Chevron:  The Two-Step Approach 
to Agency Statutory Interpretation 
In Chevron, the Supreme Court drastically altered the existing framework 
that governed judicial review of agency statutory interpretation since the 
beginnings of the administrative state.51  In Chevron, the Court considered 
the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) interpretation of 
amendments made to the Clean Air Act (CAA),52 in which the agency 
concluded that the term “stationary source” referred to power plants as a 
 
 43. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135–36; see also Reese, supra note 38, at 1117–18. 
 44. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139–40 (finding that the administrator was engaged in fact 
finding and thus his determination was a mixed question of fact and law); see also Reese, 
supra note 38, at 1118. 
 45. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
 46. See id.; see also Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them 
“Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1153 (2012). 
 47. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139. 
 48. See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 811–12. 
 49. See id. at 812–14. The late 1990s, however, saw a revival of Skidmore deference and 
its application to an agency’s informal findings and interpretations. See Kristin E. Hickman 
& Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
1235, 1236–38, 1241 (2007). 
 50. See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 812; see also Thomas W. Merrill, 
Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 974–75 (1992); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2082 (1990). 
 51. See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 814. 
 52. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-96, 91 Stat. 685. 
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whole, rather than to any specific additions or modifications to existing 
plants, known as the “bubble concept.”53  Thus, under its “bubble concept,” 
the EPA could avoid subjecting a plant to a rigorous review process as long 
as any modifications to the plant did not lead to a significant increase in 
overall emissions, allowing the EPA to prevent the CAA from causing 
unreasonable economic harm, a stated purpose of the CAA amendments.54 
Famously, the Chevron Court held that there are two steps guiding a 
court’s process of review when examining an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute it administers.55  The first step of the Chevron two-step approach 
requires a reviewing court to determine whether congressional intent was 
clear by a plain reading of the statute.56  A finding of clear and 
unambiguous language ends the inquiry in favor of a reading in compliance 
with the will of Congress.57  If a reviewing court cannot determine 
Congress’s intent, it is required to take a second step:  deference to the 
agency’s interpretation of statutory ambiguity, contingent upon a 
demonstration that the agency’s determination was reasonable.58  Thus, the 
Court found that judicial review of an agency’s statutory interpretation 
required a grant of deference under its newly created approach.59 
The Court rationalized this standard of deference in several important 
ways.60  First, the Chevron Court determined that congressional delegation 
mandated its deferential second step, holding that statutory ambiguity 
evidenced Congress’s intent to grant agencies the authority to provide 
meaning to “gaps” in the statutes they administer.61  The Court found that 
although congressional delegation is often explicitly granted to 
administrative agencies, statutory ambiguity could be considered an implicit 
 
 53. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839–42 
(1984); see also Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise:  A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to 
Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 739 (2007). 
 54. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839–40; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. 
Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory 
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1085 (2008).  One of the major 
purposes of the amendments was to “allow reasonable economic growth to continue in an 
area.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 851 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, pt. 211 (1977)). 
 55. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842; see also Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 
1011–12 (9th Cir. 2006); Melina Forte, May Legislative History Be Considered at Chevron 
Step One?  The Third Circuit Dances the Chevron Two-Step in United States v. Geiser, 54 
VILL. L. REV. 727, 727–28 (2009). 
 56. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 57. Id. (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as 
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”); 
see also Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217–18 (2002); Matthew C. Stephenson & 
Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 598–99 (2009). 
 58. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44; see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255 
(2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 195–96 (2006). 
 59. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44; see also Mary Holper, The New Moral Turpitude Test:  
Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1241, 1255–56 (2011). 
 60. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–45. 
 61. See id.; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 
(2000) (“Deference under Chevron to an agency’s construction of a statute that it administers 
is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from 
Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.”). 
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delegation that deserves a similarly deferential treatment by the judiciary.62  
Second, the Court offered two additional policy considerations to 
rationalize its holding:  the judiciary’s lack of expertise63 and the executive 
branch’s inherent democratic accountability.64 
In applying its two-step approach to the EPA’s interpretations, the Court 
first examined whether the CAA’s amendments contained any clear 
evidence of Congress’s intent.65  Upon a finding that Congress did not 
directly speak to the issue of whether the term “stationary source” could be 
defined by the “bubble concept,” the Court looked to the reasonableness of 
the EPA’s interpretation, thus granting the agency deference.66  Ultimately, 
under this deferential standard, the Court found that the EPA had 
reasonably interpreted the amendments, meeting its burden under the 
Court’s two-step analysis.67 
3.  The Competing Foundational Theories of 
Chevron’s Two-Step Approach 
The overall importance of the Chevron Court’s ruling has attracted 
scholarly attention to the Court’s motivations in constructing the two-step 
approach.  First, Part I.B.4.a discusses how Chevron’s two-step approach 
may be grounded in an agency expertise model that finds support in 
Chevron’s text and in the administrative state’s theoretical framework.  
Next, Part I.B.4.b examines Chevron’s most popular foundational theory, 
the implicit delegation rationale.  Finally, Part I.B.4.c briefly examines 
Chevron’s political accountability rationale. 
a.  The Agency Expertise Model 
Although the Chevron Court did not condition its grant of deference on 
any demonstration of agency expertise, some scholars have argued that 
Chevron’s principles originate in the New Deal era’s conception of the 
administrative state as a body of technocratic officials that exhibit expertise 
in their respective fields.68  Furthermore, scholars grounding Chevron in the 
 
 62. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (comparing the deferential treatment of implicit 
congressional delegation with explicit congressional delegation); see also Sunstein, supra 
note 58, at 195–96. 
 63. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (finding that because “[j]udges are not experts in the 
field,” agency statutory interpretation should be held to a deferential standard); see also 
Sunstein, supra note 58, at 197. 
 64. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66 (noting that agencies are politically accountable by 
virtue of their placement in the executive branch of government); see also Forte, supra note 
55, at 732 n.35. 
 65. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. at 866; see also Reese, supra note 38, at 1143 (“The Court indicated that the 
agency advanced a reasonable explanation for its conclusion that the regulations serve both 
the environmental objectives and the reasonable economic growth objectives of the 
statute.”). 
 68. See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 824–25 (discussing the presumption 
that the Court granted Chevron deference to the EPA because agencies “usually have more 
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agency expertise model point to the highly technical and complex nature of 
agency-administered statutes, claiming that they often “address technical 
subjects using industry-specific terminology, which agencies are better 
equipped to comprehend, contextualize, and apply.”69 
The agency expertise model is further supported by the Chevron Court’s 
reliance on the historical understanding of agencies as specialized experts 
and on the Court’s determination that expert agencies are better equipped to 
interpret the statutes they administer.70  In Chevron, the Court explicitly 
observed that the CAA’s amendments were of a highly complex and 
technical nature and that Congress, in enacting ambiguous language, may 
have purposefully delegated power to “those with great expertise” to 
interpret the statute’s industry-specific scientific and economic terms.71  
Furthermore, the Chevron Court justified the doctrine’s deferential second 
step by pointing to the judiciary’s lack of expertise, ultimately finding that 
expert agencies were in the best position to engage their experience in 
interpreting statutory language.72  As a result, Chevron’s agency expertise 
model requires the judiciary to rely on the statutory interpretation of 
agencies that, as experts in their field, have more experience than courts in 
interpreting the statutes they administer.73 
Although both Chevron’s precursors and Chevron itself provide evidence 
for the expertise rationale, some scholars remain skeptical as to whether the 
two-step approach primarily originates in the agency expertise model.74  
First, critics argue that an agency’s statutory interpretation is most 
substantially impacted by political and policy considerations, and as a 
 
relevant expertise than do courts”); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 
1271, 1286–88 (2008) (“Administrative agencies’ superior experience and expertise in 
particular regulatory fields offers a second popular justification for Chevron deference.”); 
Note, The Two Faces of Chevron, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1562, 1563 (2007) (“Expertise also 
serves a nonfunctional role as an implied motivation for the congressional delegation to the 
agency that is the real focus of the Supreme Court’s Chevron inquiry.”); supra note 16 and 
accompanying text; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug?  Administrative Agencies 
As Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1058 (1998); Patricia M. Wald, The “New 
Administrative Law”—With the Same Old Judges in It?, 1991 DUKE L.J. 647, 658–59 
(discussing the difficulty in “asking judges to familiarize themselves enough with the 
policies and operations of the dozens of agencies that appear in hundreds of cases a year, and 
whose functions vary from labor to shipping to nuclear energy to gas regulation”). 
 69. See Criddle, supra note 68, at 1286; see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n, Inc. 
v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 339 (2002) (finding that when a statute is “technical, 
complex, and dynamic,” agencies have authority to interpret that statute under Chevron); 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (noting that 
agencies are better suited to make interpretative determinations due to their familiarity with 
their regulatory field). 
 70. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 596 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(finding that Chevron did not alter Skidmore’s historical agency expertise model); Note, 
supra note 68, at 1566 (referencing the Chevron Court’s discussion of agency expertise). 
 71. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 74. See Criddle, supra note 68, at 1287; Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?  
Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 735, 754 (2002) (finding that Chevron deference is a departure from the expertise 
rationale). 
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result, expertise is rarely implicated.75  Second, critics claim that because 
the Chevron Court only offered expertise as a secondary justification for its 
two-step approach, it is incorrect to ground the doctrine in an agency 
expertise model.76 
b.  Silent Power:  Implicit Congressional Delegation 
Arguably the most popular and well-supported foundational rationale of 
Chevron’s two-step approach is the implicit delegation theory.77  The 
theory of implicit congressional delegation finds its support in the Chevron 
Court’s formulation of the doctrine’s second step, in which the Court rested 
on two important determinations in constructing the Chevron framework.78  
First, the Chevron Court determined that statutory ambiguity represented an 
implicit delegation by Congress to provide the agency charged with 
administering the statute with interpretative authority.79  After establishing 
that statutory ambiguities were evidence of congressional delegation, the 
Chevron Court equated that implicit grant of authority with Congress’s 
ability to explicitly delegate, finding that the equivalence between implicit 
and explicit delegations required judicial deference to agencies exercising 
their authority when interpreting statutory ambiguity.80 
Although the implicit delegation rationale is a popular and well-
supported foundational theory, it continues to attract some criticism.81  
 
 75. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1683–87 (1975); see Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts 
v. EPA:  From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 92 (2008). 
 76. See Criddle, supra note 68, at 1287; Note, supra note 68, at 1563 (“[The] Supreme 
Court’s Chevron jurisprudence seems motivated primarily by separation of powers concerns, 
with agency expertise relevant only at the margins of the doctrine.”). 
 77. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 
(2005) (noting that ambiguities in statutes are implicit delegations to agencies); United States 
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (claiming that Chevron deference relies on 
congressional delegation); MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 827 (“Chevron itself, 
and subsequent cases and commentary, have grounded Chevron deference in a presumption 
. . . about [implied] congressional intent.”); Criddle, supra note 68, at 1284 (“Arguably the 
leading rationale for Chevron deference is the presumption that Congress delegates 
interpretive authority to administrative agencies when it commits regulatory statutes to 
agency administration.”); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 
GEO. L.J. 833, 870–72 (2001). 
 78. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) 
(discussing the implicit delegation rationale); see MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 
827–28; supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 79. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. at 159; MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 827–28. 
 80. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 81. See CSX Transp. v. United States, 867 F.2d 1439, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Edwards, 
J., dissenting) (noting that the implicit delegation rationale potentially violates constitutional 
separation of powers); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 77, at 871 (discussing the lack of 
evidence supporting the claim that agencies are the main interpreters of statutory ambiguity); 
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
511, 517 (noting that the implicit delegation rationale potentially represents a legal fiction); 
Sunstein, supra note 50, at 2090–91 (expressing doubt that Congress implicitly delegates to 
administrative agencies). 
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Despite the Chevron Court’s holding regarding implicit delegation, critics 
claim there is little to no evidence that Congress intends to delegate its 
power when drafting vague or ambiguous statutory language.82  As a result, 
supporters of the rationale have often conceded that the theory represents a 
legal fiction.83  Still, critics of the implicit delegation theory point to 
traditional, pre-Chevron conceptions of explicit delegation that contradict 
the soundness of this legal fiction.84 
c.  The Political Accountability Rationale 
Finally, some commentators have grounded Chevron’s two-step 
approach in the political accountability of administrative agencies, focusing 
on their position in the executive branch and close relationship to the 
president to assert their indirect accountability to the voting public.85  The 
political accountability rationale’s primary claim lies in the Chevron 
Court’s explicit reliance on the democratic accountability of administrative 
agencies when rationalizing its second, deferential step.86  Those critical of 
the political accountability rationale focus on the Chevron Court’s 
discussion of political accountability, specifically on the Court’s explicit 
assertion that agencies alone are not accountable to the public.87 
C.  The Intersection of Chevron and Immigration Law 
The U.S. government, through its executive and legislative authority, 
retains the exclusive power to regulate immigration within the United 
States.88  Despite the existence of federal authority, early immigration 
regulation took place on the state level, with much of the legislation aimed 
 
 82. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 77, at 871; Sunstein, supra note 50, at 2090–91. 
 83. See Scalia, supra note 81, at 517; see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 77, at 871. 
 84. See, e.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982) 
(demonstrating the traditional, pre-Chevron viewpoint that explicit congressional delegations 
to agencies warranted the highest level of judicial deference); Rowan Cos. v. United States, 
452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981) (same); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 308–09 (1979) 
(same); see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 77, at 871. 
 85. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 531 (2009) (holding that statutory ambiguity 
may represent congressional delegation to an “accountable administrative body”); MANNING 
& STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 825 (discussing Chevron deference and democratic 
accountability); Criddle, supra note 68, at 1288–89 (examining the “political accountability” 
rationale of Chevron deference); supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 86. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 
(1984) (“Judges . . . are not part of either political branch of Government . . . .  While 
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely 
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices . . . .”); 
see also MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 14, at 825; Criddle, supra note 68, at 1288. 
 87. See Criddle, supra note 68, at 1289. 
 88. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (stating that Congress has the power to “establish a 
uniform Rule of Naturalization”); see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 
(2012) (discussing the “well-settled” constitutional power of the federal government to 
regulate immigration within its borders); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (noting the 
long line of Court precedent recognizing the federal government’s constitutional power to 
regulate immigration); LaJuana Davis, Reconsidering Remedies for Ensuring Competent 
Representation in Removal Proceedings, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 123, 125 (2009). 
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at encouraging, rather than restricting, immigration.89  Despite this 
traditional model of regulation, the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries saw an increased demand for federal intervention, culminating in 
some of the first pieces of legislation aimed at taxing and excluding 
immigrants from entering the United States.90 
Strict federal regulations remained at the forefront of immigration 
regulation throughout the twentieth century, crystallized by the rigid quota 
system of the Immigration Act of 1924.91  In 1952, Congress passed its 
most important act regulating immigration within the United States:  the 
INA.92  Although the INA has undergone substantial amendment processes 
since its original enactment, the INA remains the statute primarily 
responsible for directing the operation of immigration regulation within the 
United States.93 
As originally enacted in 1952, the INA had some basic features that did 
not substantially differ from previous congressional acts that also regulated 
immigration.94  Primarily, the INA continued the national origins quota 
system, established annual quotas on all immigrants except those who 
originated in the Western Hemisphere, and placed preferences on 
immigrants with specific skill sets.95 
 
 89. See 1 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 2.02–.04 
(2004), reprinted in STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND 
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 14 (5th ed. 2009). 
 90. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION:  PROCESS AND POLICY 
2–3 (3d ed. 1995) (noting the nineteenth-century practice of taxing Chinese immigrants to 
provide a disincentive for further immigration); GORDON ET AL., supra note 89, at 14–15 
(describing the “[c]ontinued demand for federal action” regarding immigration regulation, 
ultimately culminating in the taxation of immigration); Michelle Rae Pinzon, Note, Was the 
Supreme Court Right?  A Closer Look at the True Nature of Removal Proceedings in the 
21st Century, 16 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 29, 33–35 (2003). 
 91. See Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153, 159; see also GORDON ET AL., supra note 89, at 
15–16; Kathryn M. Bockley, A Historical Overview of Refugee Legislation:  The Deception 
of Foreign Policy in the Land of Promise, 21 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 253, 259 (1995).  
Although the 1924 Act placed a numerical limit on immigration, the quota did not apply to 
native citizens of the Western Hemisphere. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 89, at 16. 
 92. Pub. L. No. 82-114, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–
1537 (2006)). 
 93. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 89, at 17 (“Although the [INA] has been repeatedly 
amended, it is still the basic statute dealing with immigration and nationality.”); LEGOMSKY 
& RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 2. 
 94. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 201–207; see also GORDON ET AL., supra 
note 89, at 17–18 (discussing President Truman’s objections to the INA’s continued reliance 
on the national origins quota system).  The INA’s continuance of the national origins quota 
system was controversial, resulting in a presidential veto eventually overcome by the vote of 
Congress.  See GORDON ET AL., supra note 89, at 17–18. 
 95. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 201–203; see also GORDON ET AL., supra 
note 89, at 17; Pinzon, supra note 90, at 38–39; Milestones:  1945–1952, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
ST., http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/ImmigrationAct (last visited Oct. 21, 
2013). 
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1.  Traditional Agency Hierarchy:  The Immigration and 
Naturalization Service 
From the creation of the administrative state in the early 1940s to the 
agency’s restructuring in 2002, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) held the primary responsibility of administering the INA and 
regulating immigration within the United States.96  In addition, Congress 
delegated the primary authority to administer the INA to the U.S. Attorney 
General (AG), who delegated that authority to several agencies within the 
Department of Justice (DOJ).97  In turn, the DOJ oversaw the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) that acted through its several units 
as the main adjudicatory arm of the agency.98  The EOIR’s first unit, the 
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ), coordinated and directed the 
hundreds of Immigration Judges (IJ) throughout the United States who 
presided over the adjudicatory hearings of the agency.99  The BIA, the 
EOIR’s second unit, heard all appeals stemming from the decisions of IJs as 
well as other decisions within the agency.100  Finally, the EOIR was 
comprised of a third unit, the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing 
Officer (OCAHO), which directed evidentiary hearings in specialized 
circumstances regarding the employment of noncitizens and accusations of 
employment discrimination.101 
In addition to the DOJ, the Department of State (DOS), the Department 
of Labor (DOL), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
were also responsible for the regulation of immigration within the United 
States.102  Traditionally, the DOS functioned as an administrator of 
immigration law, specifically by issuing or denying visas to immigrants 
attempting to enter the United States and by overseeing the various 
educational exchange and refugee programs.103  In contrast, the HHS 
traditionally had a much smaller role, handling only the care of children 
entering the United States and making judgments on the admissibility of 
injured or ill immigrants.104  Finally, the DOL handled the admission of 
 
 96. See Overview of INS History to 1998, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgn
extoid=b7294b0738f70110VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=bc9cc9b1b49
ea110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD (last updated May 27, 2009); see also LEGOMSKY & 
RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 2; RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION § 2:1 (2012). 
 97. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 103(a) (charging the AG with the 
“administration and enforcement” of the INA); see also Enoka Herat, Comment, Ninth 
Circuit v. Board of Immigration Appeals:  Defining “Sexual Abuse of a Minor” After 
Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 84 WASH. L. REV. 523, 533 (2009). 
 98. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 3; STEEL, supra note 96, § 2:5. 
 99. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 3; STEEL, supra note 96, §§ 2:5, 2:8. 
 100. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 4; STEEL, supra note 96, §§ 2:5, 2:6. 
 101. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 4; Background, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
JUST., http://www.justice.gov/eoir/OcahoMain/ocahosibpage.htm (last updated Aug. 2013); 
see also STEEL, supra note 96, § 2:20. 
 102. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 4. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. 
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immigrants attempting to enter the United States for employment 
purposes.105 
2.  Evolution Towards the Department of Homeland Security and 
Maintenance of Agency Structure 
As a response to the events of September 11, 2001, the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 (HSA) restructured the various federal agencies 
responsible for national security and immigration regulation and brought 
them under a single administrative agency—the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS).106  The HSA, among other things, allowed for the 
president to divide the agency into enforcement and service branches, 
ultimately leading to the conversion of the DHS into three separate entities:  
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), responsible for immigration enforcement, and the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), responsible for service 
functions.107  Thus, the DHS, through these various entities, replaced the 
INS as the primary administrator of the INA.108  Dividing the agency into 
three separate entities fundamentally altered the INS and the traditional 
structure of federal immigration regulation.109  Despite the radical changes 
imposed by the HSA, many of the functions previously exercised by 
various arms of the INS were delegated to newly created entities, thus 
making the change in name only.110 
First, the HSA explicitly authorized the EOIR, as well as the AG’s power 
to regulate it.111  Additionally, the HSA codified the AG’s power to review 
the decisions of the BIA and gave statutory recognition to the binding 
nature of BIA decisions on the entire DHS.112  Thus, under the HSA, the 
DOJ retained its administrative agency, the EOIR, and remained 
empowered to exercise its traditional adjudicatory role over removal 
 
 105. See id. 
 106. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 101, 471, 116 Stat. 
2135 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. §§ 111, 291 (2006)); see also LEGOMSKY & 
RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 2; DANIEL LEVY, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION 
HANDBOOK, § 1:9 (2013); STEEL, supra note 96, § 2:1. 
 107. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (examining the 
enforcement functions of ICE and CBP); see also LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, 
at 3; LEVY, supra note 106, § 1:9. 
 108. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (charging the DHS with administering the INA and 
immigration laws); LEVY, supra note 106, § 1:9; Davis, supra note 88, at 126. 
 109. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 3; see also STEEL, supra note 96, § 
2:1. 
 110. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 5; LEVY, supra note 106, § 1:9 
(describing the roles of the EOIR, BIA, AG, DOJ, and USCIS as either unchanged by the 
HSA or similar to that of the INS’s previous functions). 
 111. See 6 U.S.C. § 521; 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) (authorizing the AG to enforce and enact 
all immigration regulations); LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 3 (stating that the 
HSA had given the EOIR “statutory recognition for the first time”); Davis, supra note 88, at 
125 (noting the congressional delegation of regulatory and adjudicatory power to the AG in 
the context of immigration law). 
 112. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2012); see also LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, 
at 4. 
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hearings and other similar evidentiary hearings in the same manner it had 
before 2002.113  Additionally, CBP, in its border patrol and enforcement 
functions, simply overtook the former responsibilities of the INS Border 
Patrol.114  Furthermore, although the HSA drastically altered the structure 
of immigration service and enforcement, it also left untouched the DOL’s, 
DOS’s, HHS’s, and DOJ’s regulatory functions by maintaining and 
explicitly authorizing many of their traditional powers.115 
Finally, taking into account the drastic change in structure, hierarchy, and 
terminology, the HSA provided that any reference to the INS’s previous 
structure would be considered a reference to its DHS equivalent.116  Thus, 
although the HSA altered the traditional structure of federal immigration 
regulation, it preserved many of the same functions that preceded its 
enactment.117 
3.  The History and Power of Removability 
The federal government’s implied power to remove individuals from 
within the borders of the United States has been consistently upheld and 
supported as a power rooted in the sovereignty of the nation.118  
Deportability, in general or on the specific basis of criminal activity, has 
been viewed as a punitive measure that draws comparisons to criminal law 
and the criminal justice system.119  Deportation traces its history to the 
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which permitted the removal of citizens of 
nations at war with the United States.120  By the late nineteenth century, 
Congress extended its removal power by enacting legislation that allowed 
for the deportation of immigrants that had illegally entered the United 
States.121 
 
 113. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 3–4; see also LEVY, supra note 106, 
§ 1:9. 
 114. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Border Reorganization Fact Sheet 
(Jan. 30, 2003), available at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/library/2013/02/26/
Juvenile_factsheet.pdf; see also LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 3. 
 115. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 3–4. 
 116. See 6 U.S.C. § 557; LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 5. 
 117. See supra notes 110–16 and accompanying text. 
 118. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (describing the 
“inherent” sovereign powers of the federal government to regulate immigration and specify 
rules for removability); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765–66 (1972) (stating that it 
is a well settled principle that the U.S. government has the power to deport, stemming from 
its powers as a sovereign nation); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) 
(holding that the United States’ power to deport was “absolute and unqualified”); Pinzon, 
supra note 90, at 41. 
 119. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 152–53, 549, 554–55; Stephen H. 
Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:  Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal 
Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 471 (2007) (discussing the close connection 
between immigration law and criminal law); see also Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 740 (“[To 
be] forcibly taken away from home, and family, and friends, and business, and property, and 
sent across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment.”). 
 120. See Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, § 1, 1 Stat. 566, 566–67; see also STEEL, supra 
note 96, § 1:1; Pinzon, supra note 90, at 40. 
 121. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 516; STEEL, supra note 96, § 1:1. 
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In 1910, Congress further enlarged its deportation powers by authorizing 
the removal of aliens who had been admitted to the United States legally 
but had engaged in prostitution after their arrival, marking the first time 
Congress sanctioned post-entry removal on the basis of illegal or “immoral” 
behavior.122  Since these early measures, Congress has added and amended 
its list of criminal and noncriminal misbehaviors that warrant deportation, 
continuing its focus on post-entry removability.123 
a.  Post-entry Removability Under § 1227(a) and the 
“Aggravated Felony” Standard of § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
The DHS, pursuant to its role as an administrative agency with the power 
to regulate immigration124 and its function as the primary administrator of 
the INA,125 has the power to remove any alien from the United States who 
has violated § 1227(a).126  Thus, § 1227(a) is the primary INA provision 
dealing with the removal of immigrants already residing within the United 
States.127  As is clear from its title alone,128 § 1227 classifies the types of 
aliens that could become subject to removal by the DHS.129  As currently 
amended, § 1227(a) provides six classes of “deportable aliens” that could be 
subject to the removal proceedings of the DHS and AG:  (1) aliens who 
have gained unlawful admission or entry into the United States,130 (2) aliens 
who have committed a criminal offense within the United States,131 (3) 
aliens who have engaged in the falsification of documents or have failed to 
register,132 (4) aliens found to pose a threat to national security,133 (5) aliens 
who are likely to become a public charge,134 and finally, (6) aliens engaging 
in an unlawful voting practice.135 
 
 122. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 516–17; STEEL, supra note 96, 
§ 1:1. 
 123. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 516; see also Daniel Kanstroom, 
Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment:  Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make 
Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1911 (2000) (discussing the twentieth century change 
in focus from pre-entry to post-entry in statutes governing removability and deportation). 
 124. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 125. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 126. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006) (“Any alien . . . in and admitted to the United States 
shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is within one or more 
of the following classes of deportable aliens . . . .”); see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. 
Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (discussing the DHS’s role in enforcing immigration law, including 
the INA’s removability provisions). 
 127. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)–(6) (listing classes of deportable aliens); Jacqueline P. 
Ulin, A Common Sense Reconstruction of the INA’s Crime-Related Removal System:  
Eliminating the Caveats from the Statue of Liberty’s Welcoming Words, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1549, 1554 (2000) (citing § 1227(a) when discussing the INA’s grounds for removal). 
 128. Section 1227 is explicitly titled “Deportable aliens.”  See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1227. 
 129. See id. § 1227(a) (describing the classification of “deportable aliens”). 
 130. Id. § 1227(a)(1). 
 131. Id. § 1227(a)(2). 
 132. Id. § 1227(a)(3). 
 133. Id. § 1227(a)(4). 
 134. Id. § 1227(a)(5). A public charge is defined as an “individual who is likely to 
become primarily dependent on the government for subsistence.”  See Public Charge, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.
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While § 1227(a) broadly outlines the six classes of aliens subject to the 
DHS’s removal process, each individual class is the subject of further 
statutory specification, including the second listed class of aliens found to 
have committed a criminal offense pursuant to § 1227(a)(2).136  In further 
specifying what criminal offenses trigger removability pursuant to  
§ 1227(a)(2), the statute lists several types of crimes that could lead to the 
removal of an alien, including but not limited to the “aggravated felony” 
class under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).137  On its face, § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
provides that an alien who has been convicted of an “aggravated felony” is 
included within the “criminal offenses” class of deportable aliens under 
§ 1227(a).138  Thus, pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), any alien within the 
United States convicted of an aggravated felony is at risk of undergoing a 
DHS-initiated removal process and ultimately, being deported.139 
b.  Filling in the Gaps:  The Definitional Guide of § 1101(a) 
Despite providing an exhaustive list of the type of aliens subject to the 
DHS’s removal process, § 1227(a) does not explicitly define the bulk of its 
terms.140  As a definitional guide for § 1227(a), and for the INA in general, 
§ 1101(a) defines over fifty terms that appear within the INA, including 
what constitutes an “aggravated felony” pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).141  
Specifically, § 1101(a)(43)(A)–(U) defines “aggravated felony” by 
explicitly listing various crimes, ranging from, but not limited to:  
“murder,”142 “rape,”143 “sexual abuse of a minor,”144 trafficking in 
“firearms,”145 trafficking in “controlled substances,”146 and 
“counterfeiting.”147 
As a result, § 1101(a)(43), used in conjunction with § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 
provides the DHS, individual IJs, and the BIA with a guide to determining 
how an alien could meet the “aggravated felony” standard of 
 
eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=829b0a5659083210VgnVCM100000082
ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=829b0a5659083210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last 
updated Sept. 3, 2009). 
 135. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(6). 
 136. The “criminal offenses” class of deportable aliens in § 1227(a)(2) contains five 
subclasses which further specify the crimes triggering removability under the statute:  (1) 
aliens convicted of “crimes of moral turpitude,” (2) “multiple criminal convictions,” 
(3) “aggravated felon[ies],” (4) “high speed flight[s],” and (5) “failure to register as a sex 
offender.” See id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(v). 
 137. See id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 138. See id. (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after 
admission is deportable.”). See generally id. § 1227(a). 
 139. See infra notes 150–60 and accompanying text. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1227 
(outlining the types of aliens that may be deported and thus subject to the removal process). 
 140. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (providing itself as a definitional guide for § 1227). 
 141. See id. § 1101(a)(43) (defining the term “aggravated felony”). 
 142. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(A). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(C). 
 146. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 
 147. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(R). 
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§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and thus fall within the “deportable aliens” class 
pursuant to § 1227(a), triggering the initiation of the removal process.148  
Because § 1101(a)(43) is not exhaustive, however, individual IJs and the 
BIA are often forced to interpret the meaning of both § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
and of the definitions contained within § 1101(a)(43).149 
c.  The Removal Process Under § 1227(a) 
The DHS, charged with administering the INA, also bears the primary 
responsibility of initiating the removal of aliens who have been deemed 
deportable by the agency.150  The DHS, acting on its suspicion that an 
admitted alien falls within any one of the six “deportable alien” classes 
pursuant to § 1227(a), will begin the removal process by determining 
whether sufficient evidence exists to prove the alien is in fact deportable 
within the meaning of the INA.151  If such evidence exists, the DHS and 
EOIR will issue a charging document to the alien, known as a Notice to 
Appear, outlining the violation and informing the alien of the removal 
proceedings and of their rights.152  Although undocumented citizens and 
other unlawfully admitted citizens may be subject to an expedited removal 
process if found to be removable under § 1227(a), lawful permanent 
citizens are generally provided a removal hearing in front of an IJ who will 
preside over the proceedings in the first instance, hear all evidence, and 
ultimately decide whether the alien is removable under the INA.153  After 
the alien is sufficiently notified via the Notice to Appear, the DHS, after 
determining whether the alien is to be detained prior to any final removal 
decision,154 transfers all responsibility to the adjudicatory arm of the DOJ, 
the EOIR.155 
The EOIR, under the specific supervision of an IJ assigned to the case, 
conducts the removal hearing during which the alien may contest his or her 
alleged violations of the INA against ICE officials representing the DHS.156  
 
 148. See generally id. § 1101(a) (noting that its definitional guide applies to the entire 
chapter, which includes § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)’s removability provision). 
 149. See, e.g., James v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2008) (reviewing the BIA’s 
interpretation of definitions contained within § 1101(a)(43)); Wong Park v. Attorney Gen., 
472 F.3d 66 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2001) (same). 
 150. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (discussing the 
discretionary power that federal officials have in choosing whether to initiate the removal 
process). 
 151. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3); LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 650 
(discussing the DHS’s general removal procedure for aliens who violate the immigration 
laws). 
 152. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, IMMIGRATION 
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 57–58 (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/
OCIJPracManual/Practice_Manual_review.pdf; Davis, supra note 88, at 128. 
 153. See Davis, supra note 88, at 128–29. 
 154. The violation of certain INA provisions may trigger mandatory detention, 
particularly in the context of behavior violating the statute’s crime-related prohibitions. See 
LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 651. 
 155. See Davis, supra note 88, at 128. 
 156. Immigrants charged with removal may contest removability by seeking asylum or 
other forms of relief. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012). 
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After conducting the hearing, the IJ must determine whether the individual 
is removable or should be granted relief from removal.157  If the alien is 
found to be removable at the conclusion of the hearing, the alien may 
appeal the IJ’s decision to the BIA.158  If the BIA denies the appeal, the 
EOIR enters a final order of removal against the alien.159  Once the EOIR 
has issued its order to remove the alien, it transfers its responsibility back 
again to the DHS, which enforces the order of removal.160  At this point, all 
administrative appeals are exhausted, and the alien must petition a circuit 
court with jurisdiction over the removal hearing to further challenge their 
removal.161 
4.  Application of Chevron to Agency Interpretations of the INA 
As the Chevron doctrine has expanded over the past thirty years, two 
important Supreme Court cases have solidified Chevron’s role in the 
regulatory field of immigration.  In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,162 the Court 
for the first time applied the principles of Chevron deference to the BIA’s 
case-by-case interpretations of the INA.163  Later, in INS v. Aguirre-
Aguirre,164 the Court affirmed Chevron’s traditional role in the context of 
immigration regulation, while also emphasizing the special need for 
Chevron deference in examining agency interpretations of the INA.165 
a.  INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca and the Initial Application of 
Chevron to the INA 
Three years after its decision in Chevron, the Court extended its 
newfound framework to agency interpretations of the INA.166  In Cardoza-
Fonseca, the Court applied the two-step approach to the BIA’s 
interpretation of the Refugee Act of 1980,167 which amended portions of the 
INA to allow refugees to seek asylum if they suffered a “well founded fear” 
of persecution in their nation of origin.168  The BIA, on the basis of its 
history in adjudicating the matter, concluded that the “well founded fear” 
language of the INA created a “clear probability of persecution” standard in 
 
 157. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, EOIR AT A 
GLANCE 1 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/09/EOIRataGlance121409
.pdf; see also Davis, supra note 88, at 129. 
 158. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 157, at 4; see also LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, 
supra note 89, at 657. 
 159. See STEEL, supra note 96, § 14:37; Davis, supra note 88, at 129. 
 160. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 89, at 659. 
 161. See id. at 657. 
 162. 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
 163. See infra notes 170–72 and accompanying text. 
 164. 526 U.S. 415 (1999). 
 165. See infra notes 176–78 and accompanying text. 
 166. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446–48. 
 167. The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.  The Refugee Act of 
1980 (RA) amended the INA’s asylum procedures by providing the AG with discretion in 
determining whether a refugee is experiencing or has a reasonable fear of experiencing 
persecution. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 427 n.4. 
 168. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 427–28. 
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which the alien seeking asylum had the burden of proving that it was 
likelier than not that they would suffer persecution if deported.169 
Upon review, the Court applied its newfound Chevron approach to the 
BIA’s interpretation of the INA.170  Ultimately, the Court held that 
Congress had clearly spoken in the statute, finding that the INA 
unambiguously differentiated the “well founded fear” and “clear probability 
of persecution” standards, thus ending the inquiry at step one of Chevron 
with no grant of deference to the BIA’s interpretation.171  Although the 
Court did not defer to the BIA’s determination, it emphasized that Chevron 
deference would be granted in the future to the agency in its construction of 
ambiguous INA terms through its process of “case-by-case adjudications,” 
even if that ambiguity was not present in the case at hand.172  Despite its 
hesitance to go beyond Chevron’s first step, Cardoza-Fonseca 
demonstrated the Court’s willingness to apply Chevron to the BIA’s case-
by-case analyses of the INA, and in general to subject agency 
interpretations of the INA to the Chevron two-step approach.173 
b.  INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre:  Affirming and Clarifying Chevron’s Role in 
Immigration Regulation 
More than a decade after the Court’s decision in Cardoza-Fonseca, the 
Aguirre-Aguirre Court reaffirmed Chevron’s role in immigration regulation 
and provided an additional basis for applying the two-step approach to 
interpretations of the INA.174  In Aguirre-Aguirre, the Court reviewed the 
BIA’s interpretation of provisions within the INA that allowed for the 
deportation of aliens that had committed a “serious nonpolitical crime” 
prior to entering the United States, even if that alien feared persecution in 
their nation of origin.175  Traditionally, the BIA has interpreted the 
provision by weighing the political nature of the crime against its 
“common-law character,” an analysis primarily driven by the agency’s 
experience adjudicating similar cases.176 
First, the Court reaffirmed the position it took in Cardoza-Fonseca 
twelve years earlier, holding that the BIA’s use of precedent to interpret the 
INA, a statute it administers, deserved an analysis under Chevron’s two-
 
 169. See id. at 446 n.30. 
 170. See id. at 446–48. 
 171. See id. at 446 n.30. 
 172. See id. at 448 (holding that the BIA’s interpretations of the INA that give the statute 
“concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication” must be analyzed under 
Chevron’s principles). 
 173. See id. at 446–47 (applying the two-step Chevron approach to the BIA’s 
interpretations of the INA). 
 174. See generally INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999). 
 175. See id. at 418. The RA, an amendment to the INA, stated, “The Attorney General 
shall not deport or return any alien . . . to a country if the Attorney General determines that 
such alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  See id. at 419 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (2006)). 
 176. See id. at 422–25 (citing In re McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90, 97–98 (B.I.A. 1984)). 
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step approach, and ultimately, deference under the doctrine’s second 
step.177  In addition, the Court emphasized the important role Chevron 
deference plays in the context of immigration, noting that because the 
judiciary was not “well positioned” to consider certain politically sensitive 
issues with the potential to impact foreign relations between the United 
States and other nations, it was particularly appropriate for agencies to do 
so.178  As a result, the Court held that it was particularly persuasive for an 
immigration agency engaged in interpreting a politically motivated 
provision of the INA to be entitled to a grant of Chevron deference.179 
II.  THE SECOND AND THIRD CIRCUITS SPLIT:  DO CHEVRON’S PRINCIPLES 
APPLY TO THE BIA’S INTERPRETATION OF THE INA’S 
“AGGRAVATED FELONY” PROVISION? 
Despite the relatively straightforward nature of Chevron’s two-step 
approach, there has been a divide among federal circuit courts regarding the 
application of the doctrine to the BIA’s interpretation of statutory language 
that does not implicate the agency’s traditional expertise.  Specifically, the 
Second and Third Circuits have split in their determinations of whether 
Chevron’s two-step approach applies to the BIA’s interpretation of the 
INA’s “aggravated felony” provision, a term drawn from criminal law.180  
While the circuit split involves the interplay between immigration law and 
criminal law, it also implicates a more general conflict regarding Chevron’s 
agency expertise rationale and its role in administrative law jurisprudence. 
Part II.A begins by exploring the Second Circuit’s application of a 
traditional Chevron analysis to the BIA’s interpretation of the INA’s 
“aggravated felony” provision, as well as to the court’s application of the 
two-step approach to the BIA’s use of a criminal statute as an interpretative 
guide.  Next, Part II.B analyzes the Third Circuit’s rejection of Chevron’s 
two-step approach when reviewing the BIA’s interpretation of the INA’s 
“aggravated felony” provision and discusses the court’s finding that the 
agency can claim no traditional expertise in interpreting criminal law. 
A.  The Second Circuit’s Application of a Traditional Chevron Analysis to 
the BIA’s Interpretation of “Aggravated Felony” 
The Second Circuit, when reviewing BIA-appealed removal hearings, 
has repeatedly held that a traditional, two-step Chevron analysis, and 
ultimately Chevron deference, is applicable to the BIA’s interpretation of 
 
 177. See id. at 424–25 (holding that because the BIA is interpreting a statute it 
administers, it is “clear that principles of Chevron deference are applicable to [the INA]”). 
 178. See id. 
 179. See id. 
 180. Compare James v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 250, 254 (2d Cir. 2008) (analyzing the BIA’s 
interpretation of the INA’s “aggravated felony” language under the traditional Chevron two-
step approach), and Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52, 55–56 (2d Cir. 2001) (same), with 
Wong Park v. Attorney Gen., 472 F.3d 66, 70–71 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the DHS’s and 
BIA’s interpretation of the INA’s “aggravated felony” language would not undergo a 
Chevron analysis due to the agency’s lack of expertise). 
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the INA’s “aggravated felony” provision despite the term’s criminal law 
origins.181  Additionally, the Second Circuit has further extended its 
application of Chevron’s two-step approach to the BIA’s use of a criminal 
statute in interpreting the INA.182  Mugalli v. Ashcroft183 and James v. 
Mukasey184 both demonstrate the Second Circuit’s willingness to apply the 
Chevron doctrine to the BIA’s interpretation of § 1101(a)(43)(A), which 
defines § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)’s “aggravated felony” language to include the 
“sexual abuse of a minor.”  These cases are discussed in Part II.A.1 and Part 
II.A.2, respectively. 
1.  Mugalli v. Ashcroft and the Two-Step Approach in the Second Circuit 
In Mugalli, the Second Circuit reviewed findings by the INS185 and BIA 
that Abdulkhaleq Mugalli had committed an “aggravated felony” as that 
term is defined by § 1101(a)(43)(A), thus making him removable pursuant 
to § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).186 
a.  Background 
Mugalli, a native citizen of Yemen, lawfully entered the United States in 
1991.187  In 1999, twenty-nine-year-old Mugalli pled guilty to rape in the 
third degree for engaging in sexual intercourse with a sixteen-year-old 
minor in violation of New York law’s “statutory rape” provision,188 
resulting in a sentence of five years’ probation.189  As a result of his guilty 
plea, the INS initiated removal proceedings against Mugalli, claiming that 
he was removable as a part of § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)’s deportable aliens class 
for his commission of an “aggravated felony” as that term is defined by 
§ 1101(a)(43)(A).190  Specifically, the INS claimed that Mugalli, pursuant 
to § 1101(a)(43)(a), had engaged in the “sexual abuse of a minor” and thus 
had committed an “aggravated felony” triggering removability.191 
 
 181. See, e.g., James, 522 F.3d at 254 (applying a traditional Chevron analysis to the 
BIA’s interpretation of the term “aggravated felony”); Mugalli, 258 F.3d at 55–56 (same). 
 182. See James, 522 F.3d at 254. 
 183. 258 F.3d at 52. 
 184. 522 F.3d at 250. 
 185. For purposes of Part II and analyzing the dispute among circuits, no significant 
distinction should be made between the INS and DHS. See discussion supra Part I.C.2–3. 
 186. See Mugalli, 258 F.3d at 53. 
 187. See id. 
 188. See id. at 53–54. New York Penal Law section 130.25 makes it a crime for an 
individual twenty-one years old or older to “engage[] in sexual intercourse with another 
person less than seventeen years old.” See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25 (McKinney 2009).  
Section 130.25 criminalizes sexual conduct with a minor despite the existence of consent, a 
statutory scheme commonly referred to as “statutory rape.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1374–75 (9th ed. 2009) (defining statutory rape as “[u]nlawful sexual intercourse with a 
person under the age of consent (as defined by statute), regardless of whether it is against 
that person’s will”). 
 189. See Mugalli, 258 F.3d at 54. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See id. 
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b.  Agency Action 
On August 6, 1999, the INS served Mugalli with a Notice to Appear 
asserting his class as a deportable alien pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 
notifying Mugalli of his upcoming removal hearing.192  Appearing before 
an IJ, Mugalli unsuccessfully argued that his conviction for rape in the third 
degree did not constitute an “aggravated felony” pursuant to 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), resulting in the IJ entering an order of removal.193 
Mugalli appealed to the BIA, which reviewed the IJ’s initial findings by 
interpreting both § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)’s “aggravated felony” language and 
§ 1101(a)(43)(A)’s definition of that provision to include the “sexual abuse 
of a minor.”194  The BIA concluded that although “aggravated felony” is 
defined within § 1101(a)(43)(A) to include “rape, murder, or sexual abuse 
of a minor,” the statute’s lack of clarity coupled with the provision’s broad 
language made it necessary for the agency to look to outside sources for 
guidance.195  Relying on past adjudications by the agency,196 the BIA found 
that § 3509(a)(8) was a helpful guideline in determining what activities 
could be classified as sexual abuse of a minor.197  Section 3509(a)(8), a 
federal criminal statute, broadly defines the sexual abuse of a minor as 
consisting of sexual intercourse with a “child,” defined as any individual 
under the age of eighteen.198  Ultimately, the BIA adopted § 3509(a)(8) in 
its interpretation of § 1101(a)(43)(A)’s “sexual abuse of a minor” language 
to include sexual intercourse with any individual under the age of 
eighteen.199  Although Mugalli argued for the BIA to instead adopt 
§ 2243(a)’s more lenient definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” as sexual 
intercourse with persons under the age of sixteen,200 the BIA rejected the 
statute in favor of § 3509(a)(8)’s broader standard.201  As a result, the BIA 
found that Mugalli’s conviction for third degree rape of a sixteen-year-old 
female constituted “sexual abuse of a minor” pursuant to § 1101(a)(43)(A) 
and thus an “aggravated felony” under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), triggering 
 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. at 57 (“[T]he BIA decided that to determine the meaning of [§ 1101], it could 
refer to other federal statutes for guidance.”). 
 196. See In re Rodgriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991 (B.I.A. 1999).  In In re 
Rodriguez-Rodriguez, the BIA determined that in interpreting the meaning of “sexual abuse 
of a minor” pursuant to § 1101(a)(43)(A), common usage of the term, congressional intent, 
and § 3509 commanded the agency to interpret the language to cover sexual intercourse with 
anyone under the age of eighteen, rather than a specific age set. See id. at 993–96. 
 197. See Mugalli, 258 F.3d at 57. 
 198. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(2), (8) (2006). 
 199. See Mugalli, 258 F.3d at 58. 
 200. Section 2243(a) defines the crime of “sexual abuse of a minor” as engaging in sexual 
intercourse with another who has “attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 
16 years.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a). 
 201. See Mugalli, 258 F.3d at 57. 
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removability under the INA.202  Consequently, the BIA issued a final order 
of Mugalli’s removal to Yemen.203 
c.  Circuit Review 
In response to the BIA’s order of removal, Mugalli petitioned the Second 
Circuit for review.204  Pursuant to the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), the final removal order of an alien 
is not reviewable if the alien was convicted of an aggravated felony.205  In 
order to properly analyze its jurisdiction over the BIA’s removal order, the 
Second Circuit began its review by determining whether Mugalli had in fact 
committed an “aggravated felony” pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as that 
term is defined by § 1101(a)(43)(A).206  As a result, the Second Circuit’s 
jurisdiction over Mugalli’s petition hinged on whether the court accepted 
the BIA’s broad interpretation of § 1101(a)(43)(A) to include “statutory 
rape” as an “aggravated felony.”207 
The Second Circuit began by first determining the appropriate standard 
of review.208  The court, upon a finding that the BIA administers the 
INA,209 held that Chevron’s two-step approach, as a “well-established” 
principle of judicial review, would clearly govern the court in its 
determination of whether “statutory rape” could be considered the “sexual 
abuse of a minor,” and thus an “aggravated felony” pursuant to the INA’s 
definition of that term.210  Although the term “aggravated felony” originates 
in criminal law, the court made no mention of this possible distinction, and 
instead applied a straightforward Chevron analysis to the BIA’s 
interpretation.211  Furthermore, the court made no effort to distinguish the 
BIA’s use of § 3509(a) as a guideline in interpreting § 1101(a)(43)(A), thus 
extending the application of Chevron even further by applying a traditional 
two-step analysis to the agency’s use and interpretation of a criminal 
statute.212  
The Second Circuit, adhering to the principles of Chevron’s first prong, 
began its analysis by engaging the text of § 1101(a)(43)(A) to determine 
 
 202. See id. at 58 
 203. See id. at 54. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See id. at 54–55 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)). 
 206. See id. 
 207. See id. (discussing the court’s need to examine the meaning of “aggravated felony” 
to determine its jurisdiction). 
 208. See id. at 55. 
 209. See id. 
 210. See id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842–43 (1984)). 
 211. See id. at 60 (“Neither the agency’s reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a), supported by 
Black’s Law Dictionary and its understanding of Congressional intent, to determine the 
meaning of ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ under § 1101(a)(43)(A), nor the resulting definition, is 
unreasonable. We therefore defer to the BIA’s interpretation of the INA under Chevron.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 212. See id. at 55, 60 (holding that a traditional Chevron analysis applied to the BIA’s 
interpretation of the INA and its use of § 3509(a)). 
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whether Congress had intended the statute’s “sexual abuse of a minor” 
provision to include specific crimes.213  Upon examining the statute, the 
court determined that § 1101(a)(43)(A) lacked any explicit congressional 
guidance as to the scope of its “sexual abuse of a minor” language.214  As a 
result, the court found § 1101(a)(43)(A) to be sufficiently ambiguous to 
warrant an analysis under Chevron’s second deferential step.215 
The Second Circuit’s finding of statutory ambiguity resulted in the court 
analyzing the BIA’s construction of § 1101(a)(43)(A) under Chevron’s 
second prong, which mandates a court to “affirm the agency’s construction 
. . . as long as that interpretation is reasonable,” a standard commonly 
known as Chevron deference.216  Although the BIA utilized a criminal 
statute in § 3509(a) as a guide in broadly defining the phrase “sexual abuse 
of a minor,” the court found, in accordance with Chevron and Supreme 
Court precedent, that the BIA was still entitled to deference in its process of 
attaching “concrete meaning” to the ambiguous language of the INA 
through “case-by-case adjudications.”217  Therefore, the Second Circuit 
granted Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of § 1101(a)(43)(A) 
to include “statutory rape,” and thus to the BIA’s determination that such a 
crime constituted an “aggravated felony” under the INA.218 
As a result of its grant of Chevron deference, the court was only required 
to determine that the BIA’s interpretation was “reasonable” to uphold the 
agency’s determination.219  Ultimately, the court found the BIA’s 
interpretation to be reasonable under Chevron’s deferential standard, 
holding that the BIA’s use of § 3509(a) and ultimate conclusions were 
aimed towards the agency’s reasonable goal of comprehensive protection of 
children.220  By deferring to the BIA, the Second Circuit held that 
§ 1101(a)(43)(A)’s “sexual abuse of a minor” provision included any crime 
involving sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of eighteen, 
representing the court’s willingness to apply a traditional Chevron analysis 
to the BIA’s interpretation of “aggravated felony.”221 
 
 213. See id. at 55–56. 
 214. See id. at 56. 
 215. See id. at 56, 60 (discussing Chevron’s “reasonableness” standard that was used as 
part two of the doctrine’s two-step approach). 
 216. See id. at 55–56 (quoting Bell v. Reno, 218 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
 217. See id. at 55–56, 60. 
 218. See id. at 60 (“We therefore defer to the BIA’s interpretation of the INA under 
Chevron.”). 
 219. See id. at 55 (holding that, under Chevron, the court “need only conclude that [the 
BIA’s] interpretation is reasonable and that it considered the matter in a detailed and 
reasoned fashion” (quoting Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 263 (2d Cir. 2000))). 
 220. See id. at 60 (“[T]he agency’s reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a) . . . to determine the 
meaning of ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ under § 1101(a)(43)(A), nor the resulting definition, is 
unreasonable.”). 
 221. See id. 
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2.  The Second Circuit’s Continued Application of Chevron 
in James v. Mukasey 
Seven years after its decision in Mugalli, the Second Circuit in James had 
the opportunity to reconsider whether the Chevron doctrine applied to the 
BIA’s interpretation of § 1101(a)(43)(A), and once again held that the two-
step approach applied to the agency’s interpretation of the term “sexual 
abuse of a minor” as a definitional guide for the INA’s “aggravated felony” 
provision.222 
a.  Background 
Petitioner Ushian Kayon James, a native citizen of Jamaica, lawfully 
entered the United States in 1999 as a permanent resident.223  In 2003, at 
the age of twenty-two, James began a sexual relationship with a sixteen-
year-old female acquaintance.224  As a result of the relationship, James was 
charged with rape in the third degree pursuant to New York Penal Law 
section 130.25, a charge commonly known as “statutory rape.”225  The 
charge was soon reduced to a misdemeanor, resulting in James pleading 
guilty to “Endangering the Welfare of a Child” in violation of New York 
Penal Law section 260.10.226  On October 3, 2003, James was convicted 
and sentenced to a probationary period of three years.227 
b.  Agency Action 
Two years after his conviction, the DHS issued James a Notice to Appear 
charging him with removability pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) for 
committing a crime of “child abuse.”228  On November 29, 2005, an IJ 
conducted a removal hearing where James, in an attempt to terminate the 
proceedings, argued that the agency had failed to demonstrate that he was 
convicted of a crime of “child abuse.”229  As a response, the DHS charged 
James with removability under a different section of the INA, claiming that 
James had committed the “aggravated felony” of “sexual abuse of a minor” 
as that term appears in § 1101(a)(43)(A).230 
Less than one year later, the IJ denied James’s motion to terminate and 
issued an order of removal.231  Although James never pled guilty to his 
original charge of rape in the third degree, the IJ determined that based on 
the original felony complaint, the sexual relationship James admitted to 
 
 222. See James v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 250, 253 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 223. See id. at 251. 
 224. See id. at 251–52. 
 225. See id. at 252; see also supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing “statutory 
rape”). 
 226. See James, 522 F.3d at 252. 
 227. See id. 
 228. See id. 
 229. See id. 
 230. See id. 
 231. See id. 
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having with a minor under the age of eighteen was “in fact the conduct 
[James] pleaded guilty to when he entered a plea of guilty to endangering 
the welfare of a child.”232  Thus, the IJ determined that James had pled 
guilty to behavior constituting the “sexual abuse of a minor” under 
§ 1101(a)(43)(A), triggering removability pursuant to the “aggravated 
felony” provision of § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).233 
On appeal to the BIA, James claimed the IJ erred in finding that his 
sexual relationship with a sixteen-year-old minor constituted the 
“aggravated felony” of “sexual abuse of a minor.”234  The BIA, in 
determining the scope of § 1101(a)(43)(A), invoked as precedent its past 
adjudications in which the agency adopted § 3509(a), a criminal statute, as a 
guide in interpreting the term “sexual abuse of a minor” to include sexual 
contact with all persons under the age of eighteen.235  As a result, the BIA, 
after concluding that the IJ had properly considered James’s guilty plea and 
felony complaint to determine that he had engaged in sexual intercourse 
with a sixteen-year-old girl,236 affirmed the IJ’s finding that James had 
committed the “aggravated felony” of “sexual abuse of a minor” as the BIA 
has traditionally interpreted that term, triggering removability under 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).237 
c.  Circuit Review 
Upon the BIA’s affirmation of the IJ’s removal order, James petitioned 
the Second Circuit, claiming, among other things, that his relationship with 
a sixteen-year-old girl did not constitute an “aggravated felony” pursuant to 
the INA.238  Reaffirming the position it took in Mugalli seven years 
earlier,239 the Second Circuit held that when its ability to review a case 
“depends on the definition of a phrase used in the INA, a statute that the 
BIA administers,” the court would apply a traditional Chevron analysis to 
the agency’s interpretation.240  Thus, the court determined it would apply 
Chevron’s two-step approach to the BIA’s interpretation of “aggravated 
 
 232. See id. 
 233. See id. at 252–53 (finding that the IJ concluded that James’s conviction constituted 
the aggravated felony of “sexual abuse of a minor under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)”). 
 234. See id. at 253. 
 235. See id. at 254 (discussing the BIA’s determination that the agency’s past adoption of 
§ 3509(a) as a guide in interpreting § 1101(a)(43)(A) to include sexual intercourse with any 
minor below the age of eighteen served as precedent and thus controlled); see also Mugalli 
v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2001); In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991, 
995–96 (B.I.A. 1999) (finding that the BIA, through its past adjudications in which it 
adopted § 3509(a) as a guide, has broadly interpreted § 1101(a)(43)(A)’s “sexual abuse of a 
minor” to include sexual intercourse with minors as an “aggravated felony”). 
 236. See James, 522 F.3d at 253. 
 237. See id. 
 238. See id. 
 239. See supra notes 211–12 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit’s 
holding in Mugalli that the principles of Chevron applied to the BIA’s interpretation of the 
INA). 
 240. See James, 522 F.3d at 253–54. 
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felony,” including the agency’s continued use of § 3509(a) as a guideline in 
determining the scope of the term “sexual abuse of a minor.”241 
In applying Chevron’s two-step approach, the Second Circuit relied on 
Mugalli, again holding that an examination of the text of § 1101(a)(43)(A) 
revealed no clear congressional intent, leading the court to conclude that the 
statute was ambiguous under Chevron’s first step.242  The court then 
engaged Chevron’s second step, examining the reasonableness of the BIA’s 
statutory construction under the doctrine’s deferential standard.243  
Ultimately, the court found that the BIA’s interpretation of 
§ 1101(a)(43)(A), as a definition for the INA’s “aggravated felony” 
provision, was reasonable in its use of § 3509(a) as a guideline in 
determining that sexual conduct with any minor under the age of eighteen 
constituted the “sexual abuse of a minor.”244  Despite the application of 
Chevron to the BIA’s determinations, the court did not defer to the agency’s 
interpretation of James’s conviction under New York law, ultimately 
leading the court to vacate the BIA’s removal order and remand the case for 
further review.245 
Although the BIA’s decision was ultimately overturned, the James court 
granted Chevron deference to the agency’s statutory construction of 
§ 1101(a)(43)(A) as a definition for the INA’s “aggravated felony” 
provision, as well as to the agency’s use of § 3509(a).246  As a result, the 
Second Circuit continued its application of Chevron’s two-step approach to 
agency interpretation of the INA’s criminally based “aggravated felony” 
provision and use of § 3509(a), a criminal statute.247 
B.  Experts Only:  The Third Circuit Determines Chevron’s Two-Step 
Approach Is Inapplicable to the BIA’s Interpretation of “Aggravated 
Felony” Due to a Lack of Agency Expertise 
In comparison to the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit in Wong Park v. 
Attorney General248 held that the Chevron two-step approach does not 
apply to the BIA’s interpretation of the term “aggravated felony” due to the 
agency’s lack of expertise in analyzing criminal law, thus leading the court 
to review the agency’s statutory construction without deference.249 
In Wong Park, the Third Circuit reviewed the BIA’s determination that 
petitioner Yong Wong Park, through his conviction for trafficking in 
counterfeit goods, was removable pursuant to the INA’s definition of 
 
 241. See id. (applying Chevron to the BIA’s interpretation of the INA and its use of 
§ 3509(a)). 
 242. See id. 
 243. See id. at 254. 
 244. See id. 
 245. See id. at 254, 259. 
 246. See id. at 254 (“We have found that the BIA’s adoption of § 3509(a) is reasonable, 
and have accorded it Chevron deference.” (citing Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52, 60 (2d 
Cir. 2001))). 
 247. See id. 
 248. 472 F.3d 66 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 249. See id. at 70–71. 
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“aggravated felony” in § 1101(a)(43)(R), which includes “offense[s] 
relating to . . . counterfeiting.”250 
1.  Background 
Yong Wong Park, a citizen of the Republic of Korea, became involved in 
a criminal scheme involving the sale of counterfeit clothing from 
approximately February 1997 to October 1997.251  On February 12, 1998, 
Wong Park was admitted into the United States.252  As a result of his 
previous criminal involvement, Wong Park pled guilty to one count of 
trafficking in counterfeit goods or services.253  On July 5, 2000, Wong Park 
was sentenced to a prison term of twenty-one months.254 
2.  Agency Action 
As a result of his conviction, the DHS issued Wong Park a Notice to 
Appear, claiming he had committed a crime of “moral turpitude” within 
five years of his admission into the United States, and charged him with 
removability pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).255  On June 25, 2002, the IJ 
presiding over Wong Park’s removal hearing granted Wong Park’s motion 
to terminate, finding that he had not committed a crime of “moral turpitude” 
and thus was not removable.256  The DHS appealed to the BIA, which 
vacated the IJ’s decision and ultimately determined that the parties were 
required to litigate the matter of whether Wong Park had committed his 
crime within five years of entering the United States before an IJ at a 
renewed removal hearing.257  Soon after, the DHS filed an additional notice 
of removability pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), charging Wong Park with 
committing the “aggravated felony” of an “offense . . . relating to 
counterfeiting,” as defined by § 1101(a)(43)(R).258 
On August 23, 2004, the IJ found that while Wong Park did not commit a 
crime of “moral turpitude,”259 he was still removable pursuant to 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for his commission of an “aggravated felony,” 
 
 250. See id. at 68. 
 251. See id. 
 252. The materials Wong Park admitted to selling included inauthentic clothing that 
“bore” the trademark of both Nike and Tommy Hilfiger. See id. at 68 n.4. 
 253. See id. at 67–68. 
 254. See id. at 68. 
 255. See id.  Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) states that an alien shall be removable if “convicted 
of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years” after admission for which 
a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006).  
For a more lengthy discussion on the “moral turpitude” standard, see Pooja R. Dadhania, 
Note, The Categorical Approach for Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude After Silva-Trevino, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 313 (2011). 
 256. See Wong Park, 472 F.3d at 68. 
 257. See id. 
 258. See id. at 69. 
 259. The IJ found that because Wong Park did not commit his counterfeiting offense 
within five years of his admission into the United States, he was not removable pursuant to 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). See id. 
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specifically an offense “relating to . . . counterfeiting.”260  The IJ, in 
examining whether Wong Park was removable, interpreted 
§ 1101(a)(43)(R)’s “relating to . . . counterfeiting” language to determine 
what crimes the INA provision included.261  First, the IJ determined that 
because § 1101(a)(43)(R) did not provide any explicit guidance as to its 
definition of “counterfeiting” and contained broad “relating to” language, 
Congress intended the statute to capture a wide scope of offenses beyond 
just counterfeiting.262  Thus, in constructing § 1101(a)(43)(R)’s “relating 
. . . to counterfeiting” language, the IJ determined that the INA provision 
also included behavior prohibited by § 2320, namely the trafficking of 
counterfeit goods.263  As a result, the IJ interpreted the language of 
§ 1101(a)(43)(R) to include the trafficking of counterfeit goods and thus 
found that such crimes constituted an “aggravated felony” pursuant to 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).264 
As a consequence of her determination that trafficking in counterfeit 
goods constituted an “aggravated felony,” the IJ found Wong Park 
removable due to his conviction of that offense under § 2320.265  Wong 
Park appealed the IJ’s interpretation and order of removal to the BIA.266  
Ultimately, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, making the order of Wong 
Park’s removal to the Republic of Korea final.267 
3.  Circuit Review 
The Third Circuit, in reviewing Wong Park’s appeal of the BIA’s 
removal order, determined that its jurisdiction rested on an examination of 
whether Wong Park committed an “aggravated felony” pursuant to 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).268  Therefore, the Third Circuit began by determining 
what standard of review it would employ when examining the BIA’s 
interpretation of § 1101(a)(43)(R) to include the crime of trafficking in 
counterfeit goods.269 
Despite the government urging the court to apply Chevron’s standard 
two-step approach to the findings of the IJ and BIA,270 the Third Circuit 
held that the agency’s interpretation would be reviewed de novo and thus 
 
 260. See id. 
 261. See id. at 69–70. 
 262. See id. at 69 (discussing the IJ’s findings that a “wide variety” of offenses could be 
considered counterfeiting and that the Supreme Court held congressional use of the term 
“relating to” as demonstrating a purpose to define the offense in its “broadest sense”). 
 263. See id. at 70 (“The IJ thus concluded that the offense criminalized by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2320 was one which related to counterfeiting within the meaning of . . . 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(R).”). 
 264. See id. at 69–70. 
 265. See id. at 70. 
 266. See id. 
 267. See id. 
 268. See id. 
 269. See id. at 70–71. 
 270. See id. at 70; see also Brief for Respondent at 11–12, Wong Park, 472 F.3d at 66 
(No. 05-2054), 2006 WL 5444158, at *12 (claiming that Chevron deference should apply to 
agency interpretation of ambiguous statutory terms). 
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receive no grant of Chevron deference.271  Although the Third Circuit 
acknowledged that deference seemed applicable to the BIA’s interpretation 
of the INA, a statute it administers,272 and that the Supreme Court 
previously held that Chevron’s two-step approach applied to such 
interpretations,273 it distinguished Wong Park by claiming the agency’s 
interpretation of “aggravated felony” involved a pure question of law that 
failed to implicate the agency’s expertise, thus making a traditional 
application of the Chevron doctrine inappropriate.274 
In distinguishing Wong Park from Aguirre-Aguirre, the Third Circuit 
focused on the IJ and BIA’s lack of expertise in interpreting the INA’s 
“aggravated felony” provision to include the crime of trafficking in 
counterfeit goods, holding that the immigration agency had “no particular 
expertise” in examining federal criminal offenses.275  Therefore, the Third 
Circuit found that because federal courts have more expertise in defining 
what crimes should be considered “relat[ed] to . . . counterfeiting,” and thus 
“aggravated felon[ies]” under the INA, the court was in the best position to 
evaluate that question of law anew and without deference to the agency.276  
The Third Circuit further distinguished Wong Park, finding that although 
the Court in Aguirre-Aguirre held that Chevron’s two-step approach applied 
to the BIA’s interpretations of the INA, the Court’s grant of deference in 
that case was motivated by highly sensitive political issues that were not 
similarly present in Wong Park.277 
Therefore, the Wong Park court held that the BIA’s lack of expertise in 
interpreting criminal law, coupled with Aguirre-Aguirre’s dissimilar fact 
pattern, led the agency’s interpretations to be reviewed without the 
traditional application of Chevron’s two-step approach.278  As a result, the 
Third Circuit held that it would review the BIA’s decision de novo, with no 
deference granted to the IJ or BIA’s previous findings.279  Despite a lack of 
deference to the BIA’s determinations, the Third Circuit held that Wong 
Park had indeed committed an “aggravated felony,” causing the court to 
ultimately affirm the BIA’s order of removal.280 
 
 271. See Wong Park, 472 F.3d at 70–71. 
 272. See id. at 70 (noting that the court “usually” grants deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute it administers). 
 273. See id. at 70–71 (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999)); see 
also supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s holding in Aguirre-
Aguirre, in which the Court applied the principles of Chevron to the BIA’s interpretation of 
the INA). 
 274. See Wong Park, 472 F.3d at 69–71. 
 275. See id. at 70–71. 
 276. See id. at 71 (“[T]he Attorney General has no particular expertise in defining a term 
under federal law, yet it is ‘what federal courts do all the time.’” (quoting Drakes v. Zimski, 
240 F.3d 246, 251 (3d Cir. 2001))). 
 277. See id. (“[T]he concerns motivating [deference in Aguirre-Aguirre] are largely 
absent here.”); see also supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text (describing the general 
facts of Aguirre-Aguirre). 
 278. See Wong Park, 472 F.3d at 70–71. 
 279. See id. at 71 (“We thus engage in de novo review.”). 
 280. See id. at 72–73. 
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III.  RESOLVING THE DIVIDE:  PROPOSING A NONTRADITIONAL MODEL OF 
AGENCY EXPERTISE AND REJECTING THE THIRD CIRCUITS’ RIGID 
“EXPERTS ONLY” CONCEPTION OF CHEVRON AND THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
Although grounding Chevron in a singular, foundational theory continues 
to attract scholarly attention, such a discussion remains beyond the scope of 
this Note.  Nevertheless, this Note attempts to resolve the split between the 
Second and Third Circuits by proposing an agency expertise model as a 
secondary rationale in Chevron’s framework that can be flexibly applied 
when examining an agency’s experience outside its traditional field, such as 
the BIA’s interpretation of INA language originating in criminal law.281 
Part III.A begins by suggesting that while the agency expertise model 
may not exist as Chevron’s primary rationale, it finds support as a 
secondary foundational theory that courts may engage when attempting to 
apply the doctrine’s two-step approach.  Building off this assertion, Part 
III.B proposes that courts engaging agency expertise should apply a flexible 
model that considers an agency’s experience outside its traditional field—
an approach evidenced both by Chevron’s text and historical role in 
administrative law.  Finally, Part III.C applies the proposed flexible agency 
expertise model to the split between the Second and Third Circuits, 
resolving the divide in favor of the Second Circuit’s application of the 
Chevron two-step approach to the BIA’s interpretation of language drawn 
from criminal law. 
A.  Chevron’s Secondary Mandate:  Agency Expertise and Its Role 
at the Periphery of the Doctrine 
The implicit delegation rationale has received a substantial amount of 
support as Chevron’s most appropriate primary rationale.282  While this 
Note does not attempt to argue that agency expertise should replace implicit 
delegation as Chevron’s primary foundational theory, it does propose that 
the Chevron Court, in formulating its two-step approach, placed some 
secondary importance on agency expertise in rationalizing the Chevron 
doctrine and its deferential standard of review.283  As a result, the Chevron 
Court left open the possibility that a court reviewing an agency’s statutory 
interpretation could, as a secondary matter, engage the agency expertise 
rationale when determining whether Chevron’s two-step approach is 
appropriate. 
The Chevron Court’s formulation and justification of its two-step 
approach support the assignment of secondary importance to agency 
expertise.284  The Chevron Court, in holding that agency statutory 
interpretation would be governed by its two-step approach, explicitly 
justified the doctrine’s deferential principles by referencing the specialized 
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expertise of administrative agencies.285  First, the Court held that Chevron 
deference was necessary due to the inherent complexity involved in 
interpreting administrative statutes, a task more easily and efficiently 
accomplished by an expert agency as opposed to a less experienced 
judge.286  Furthermore, the Court’s application of its two-step approach to 
the EPA’s interpretation in Chevron demonstrates an existing role for 
agency expertise within the doctrine’s framework.287  Specifically, the 
Court rationalized its application of Chevron deference to the EPA’s 
statutory interpretation by pointing to the EPA’s vast experience in creating, 
shaping, and interpreting environmental law.288 
Thus, although the Chevron Court may have assigned primary 
importance to implicit congressional delegation in grounding its two-step 
approach, the Court also determined that agency expertise played some 
secondary role in the initial application of the doctrine.289  As a result, 
Chevron’s framework includes, and is partially grounded in, the agency 
expertise rationale, permitting courts to secondarily engage agency 
expertise when determining whether Chevron’s two-step approach applies 
to an agency’s statutory interpretation. 
B.  The Flexible Agency Expertise Model:  Granting Administrative 
Agencies Deference Within the Nontraditional Sphere of Expertise 
Although agency expertise may play a secondary role within the Chevron 
framework, it remains unclear how a court reviewing an agency’s statutory 
interpretation should engage agency expertise when determining whether 
the two-step approach applies or whether Chevron deference is appropriate.  
This Note proposes a flexible agency expertise model that allows a court to 
consider an agency’s accumulated expertise outside its traditional field, an 
approach mandated by two defining features of Chevron’s framework:  the 
historical role Chevron played in reforming the method of judicial review 
that preceded it, and the Chevron Court’s application of its two-step 
approach to the EPA’s interpretation of statutory language outside its 
traditional sphere of expertise. 
1.  Chevron’s Rejection of Rigid Distinctions Between Expert and 
Nonexpert Mandates a Flexible Approach 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron was a landmark reformulation 
of administrative law that radically reconstructed how courts previously 
approached their review of agency statutory interpretation.290  Although 
both the pre-Chevron and Chevron doctrines share a deferential spirit, pre-
Chevron jurisprudence substantially differed in its rigidity and formalism, 
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highlighted by its reliance on the distinction between mixed questions of 
fact and law and pure questions of law.291  The pre-Chevron approach to 
judicial review grounded its deferential standard in this formal distinction, 
in which deference was only granted when an agency implicated its 
expertise by interpreting a mixed question of fact and law.292  Thus, the pre-
Chevron doctrine held that an agency’s interpretation of a pure question of 
law fell outside its sphere of expertise and did not deserve deference from 
the judiciary.293  As a result, pre-Chevron jurisprudence largely centered on 
a black-and-white analysis of whether an agency was interpreting mixed 
questions of law and fact or pure questions of law and, by extension, 
whether the agency was acting as an expert or a nonexpert.294 
Although these formal distinctions eroded before the Chevron Court’s 
landmark decision, Chevron’s straightforward, two-step approach was a 
response to the confusing, inflexible jurisprudence that had both directly 
and indirectly preceded it.295  Chevron’s two-step approach placed no 
emphasis on formal distinctions between mixed questions of fact and law or 
pure questions of law, replacing that doctrine’s rigidness with a more 
flexible, open-ended approach.296  Thus, although the Chevron Court could 
have reaffirmed the rigid expert and nonexpert distinction that dominated 
pre-Chevron law, it determined that while agency expertise played some 
role in its two-step approach, application of the Chevron doctrine would not 
be limited when an agency interprets a question of pure law.297 
Viewed as a response to the framework it replaced, Chevron was a 
theoretical reconstruction of a rigid and inflexible model of agency 
expertise.298  Chevron’s rejection of that model demonstrates that a modern 
application of its two-step approach should differ from pre-Chevron 
jurisprudence.  As a result, Chevron’s rejection and fundamental alteration 
of that inflexible framework mandates the application of a flexible agency 
expertise model that recognizes an agency’s ability to operate as an expert 
even when interpreting pure questions of law outside its traditional sphere 
of expertise. 
2.  The Chevron Court’s Application of the Two-Step Approach to the 
EPA’s Statutory Interpretation Evidences an Agency Expertise Model 
Respectful of Nontraditional Expertise 
In Chevron, the Court applied its two-step approach to the EPA’s 
interpretation of CAA amendments, in which the agency determined that 
the term “stationary source” would apply to power plants as a whole, 
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known as the “bubble concept.”299  The Court, in ultimately deferring to the 
EPA, held that the agency’s interpretation was in part an economic 
determination of what plants could be considered within the same industrial 
“bubble” in order to promote reasonable economic growth.300  Although the 
amendments were clearly intended to impact plant emissions and other 
environmental concerns well within the EPA’s traditional sphere of 
expertise, the amendment’s legislative history and use of industrial 
terminology also demonstrated that the EPA was interpreting economic and 
industrial language that overlapped with fields outside that sphere.301 
The Court’s application of its two-step approach to the EPA’s 
interpretation in Chevron demonstrates that Chevron’s framework includes 
a model of agency expertise that embraces an agency’s experience in 
interpreting statutory language outside its traditional sphere of expertise.302  
If the Chevron Court was attempting to do otherwise, it could not have 
applied its two-step approach to the EPA’s interpretation of language that 
was not solely within the realm of environmental science.303  Therefore, in 
order to avoid the improbable conclusion that the Chevron Court incorrectly 
applied its own two-step approach, courts should be permitted to engage a 
model of agency expertise that considers the experience an agency gains 
outside its traditional field of expertise. 
3.  The Secondary Importance of Agency Expertise Indicates 
a Flexible Standard 
Although agency expertise played some role in the Chevron Court’s 
construction of its two-step approach, the Court’s opinion was primarily 
grounded in implicit congressional delegation.304  Furthermore, although 
there is some evidence that agency expertise was an important theoretical 
concept during the beginnings of the administrative state, there is little 
evidence that agency expertise was the primary focus of congressional 
delegation or that the administrative state was ever truly conceived as a 
body of experts.305  Considering the secondary role agency expertise has 
historically played in the administrative state and its limited role in the 
Chevron doctrine, courts engaging an agency expertise model should 
remain flexible and not impose a strict standard where primary importance 
has not been assigned. 
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C.  Resolving the Split:  Application of the Flexible Agency Expertise Model 
to the BIA’s Interpretation of “Aggravated Felony” 
Although the Second Circuit’s decision to apply a traditional Chevron 
analysis to the BIA’s interpretation of the INA’s “aggravated felony” 
provision was largely grounded in implicit delegation, the court’s holding 
implicated the flexible agency expertise model and thus conformed to this 
Note’s proposal.306  In contrast, the Third Circuit’s use of a rigid agency 
expertise model to withhold an application of Chevron’s two-step approach 
directly opposes this Note’s proposal and finds less support in both 
Chevron’s text and in the doctrine’s historical framework.307 
1.  The Second Circuit’s Appropriate Application of the Flexible 
Agency Expertise Model 
Although the Second Circuit primarily rationalized its application of a 
traditional Chevron analysis to the BIA’s interpretation of the term 
“aggravated felony” by invoking the implicit delegation rationale, the court 
also implicated agency expertise as a secondary factor in its decision.308  
After holding that the BIA’s role as the INA’s administrator required the 
court to apply Chevron’s two-step approach to the agency’s statutory 
interpretation, the court continued by discussing the BIA’s accumulated 
experience in interpreting criminal law.309 
The Second Circuit correctly applied the Chevron doctrine by engaging a 
flexible agency expertise model as a secondary factor.310  First, the Second 
Circuit primarily relied on the implicit delegation rationale, only engaging 
agency expertise as a secondary factor when determining whether 
Chevron’s two-step approach applied to the BIA’s interpretation.311  
Additionally, the Second Circuit took a flexible approach in examining the 
BIA’s expertise in criminal law, finding that the agency had accumulated 
some experience interpreting criminal law via its past adjudications 
involving § 3509(a).312  As a result, the Second Circuit considered the 
BIA’s nontraditional expertise as a secondary factor in its determination of 
whether Chevron’s two-step approach applied to the BIA’s interpretation of 
the term “aggravated felony,” ultimately granting a traditional analysis to 
the agency.313 
 
 306. See discussion infra Part III.C.1. 
 307. See discussion infra Part III.C.2–3. 
 308. See supra notes 217, 241 and accompanying text. 
 309. See supra notes 217, 241 and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra notes 217, 241 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra notes 209–10, 240 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra notes 217, 241 and accompanying text. 
 313. See supra notes 217, 241 and accompanying text. 
2013] CHEVRON’S FLEXIBLE AGENCY EXPERTISE MODEL 1013 
2.  The Third Circuit’s Incorrect Use of Formal Distinctions Between 
Expert and Nonexpert To Withhold a Chevron Analysis from the BIA’s 
Interpretation of “Aggravated Felony” 
The Third Circuit, as a result of finding that the INA’s “aggravated 
felony” provision implicated a pure question of law, held that the BIA’s 
interpretation of that term would not undergo Chevron’s traditional two-
step approach.314  In doing so, the Third Circuit engaged a model of agency 
expertise that relied on a formal distinction between pure and mixed 
questions of law, similar to the pre-Chevron approach to judicial review of 
agency statutory interpretation.315  As a result, the Third Circuit mistakenly 
invoked a rigid model of agency expertise that the Court explicitly rejected 
in Chevron and, as a result, erred when it failed to apply Chevron’s two-
step approach to the BIA’s interpretation of the INA’s “aggravated felony” 
provision. 
3.  The Third Circuit’s Rigid Agency Expertise Model Failed To Consider 
Nontraditional Agency Expertise 
In finding that the BIA did not demonstrate a sufficient level of expertise 
in interpreting the term “aggravated felony,” a term drawn from criminal 
law, the Third Circuit conditioned the application of a Chevron analysis on 
a model of agency expertise that ignored the possibility that an agency 
could operate as an expert outside its traditional sphere of expertise.316  As 
a result of its rigid approach, the Third Circuit failed to consider two ways 
in which the BIA has gained sufficient experience outside its traditional 
field of expertise to warrant an application of Chevron’s two-step approach:  
(1) the agency’s past case-by-case adjudications construing the “aggravated 
felony” provision,317 and (2) immigration law’s close connection and 
overlap with criminal law.318 
a.  The BIA’s Nontraditional Expertise As a Result of the Agency’s Past 
Adjudications Interpreting Criminal Law 
The BIA has interpreted the INA’s “aggravated felony” provision since 
its addition to the statute, allowing the agency to gain a wealth of 
experience in construing that term and gauging how it impacts the 
removability process.319  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has explicitly 
held that the BIA has, on the basis of past adjudications, gained enough 
experience and expertise in interpreting the INA’s “aggravated felony” 
provision to warrant a traditional Chevron analysis.320  Therefore, although 
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the BIA may not traditionally be considered an expert in criminal law, the 
Third Circuit’s rigid agency expertise model failed to consider the BIA’s 
accumulated experience.  In contrast, a correct application of the flexible 
agency expertise model would, as mandated by Chevron’s framework, grant 
some deference to the BIA’s nontraditional expertise in interpreting the 
criminal term “aggravated felony.” 
b.  The BIA’s Nontraditional Expertise As a Result of Overlap Between 
Immigration Law and Criminal Law 
Although immigration law is generally considered the BIA’s traditional 
field of expertise, there is considerable overlap between immigration 
regulation and criminal law, particularly in the context of removal.321  The 
removal process and its penalization of individual behavior is a legal 
concept analogous to the deterrent role criminal law plays in punishing 
behavior society has deemed illegal or immoral.322  Furthermore, the INA 
has explicitly included criminal behavior as punishable by the threat of 
removal, evidenced by § 1227(a)’s “aggravated felony” provision.323  
Although the INA includes a wide range of criminal behavior triggering 
removability, the BIA continues to administer the statute and issue final 
rulings regarding its interpretation that bind all agencies within the DHS.324 
The clear connection between criminal law and immigration regulation, 
specifically in the context of removal, demonstrates that the BIA can 
exhibit a sufficient level of expertise when interpreting the INA’s 
“aggravated felony” provision, despite the term’s origins in criminal law 
and the agency’s traditional expertise in immigration law.  In refusing to 
apply a Chevron analysis to the BIA’s interpretations, the Third Circuit 
ignored the agency’s nontraditional expertise in interpreting criminal law 
and applied an agency expertise model far more rigid than the Chevron 
Court exacted upon the EPA’s interpretation of “stationary source,” a term 
that similarly overlapped with that agency’s traditional and nontraditional 
fields of expertise.325  As a result, the Third Circuit failed to apply a flexible 
approach that would permit the court to consider criminal law’s overlap 
with the removal process and immigration law in general, and thus 
incorrectly reviewed the BIA’s interpretation of the term “aggravated 
felony” by failing to apply Chevron’s two-step approach to the agency’s 
statutory construction. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the split between the Second and Third Circuits only implicates 
a single agency’s interpretation of a single regulatory scheme, the Chevron 
framework’s unique role as one of administrative law’s most wide-reaching 
 
 321. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 322. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 323. See supra notes 131, 136 and accompanying text. 
 324. See supra notes 108, 112 and accompanying text. 
 325. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
2013] CHEVRON’S FLEXIBLE AGENCY EXPERTISE MODEL 1015 
doctrines causes such a divide to have widespread implications across the 
entire administrative state.326  While this Note does not seek to 
fundamentally alter Chevron’s framework, it does propose that a rationale 
at its periphery, agency expertise, be remodeled as a more flexible 
approach, supported by the Chevron Court’s opinion and the doctrine’s 
historic role in administrative law jurisprudence.327 
Thus, while this Note’s proposal may be modest considering the depth of 
Chevron’s framework, the application of a flexible model of agency 
expertise to the BIA’s interpretation of the criminal term “aggravated 
felony” could impact the hundreds of administrative agencies that can also 
claim a similar nontraditional expertise.  More important than its potential 
effect on the administrative state, however, is its resolution of a circuit split 
that has created inconsistency in a removal process where millions of legal 
residents require uniformity from the law. 
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